Both supporters and opponents of the plan are concerned with the political instability produced by rival factions. The State governments have not us exceeded in solving this problem; in fact the situation is so problematic the at people are disillusioned With all politicians and blame government for their problems. Consequently, a form of popular government that can deal successfully With this problem has a great deal to recommend it. Given the nature of man, factions are inevitable.
As long as men hold different o pinions, have different amounts of wealth, and own different amount of prop arty, they will continue to fraternity with people who are most similar to them. Both serious and trivial reasons account for the formation of factions but the m cost important source of faction is the unequal distribution of property. Men of greater ability and talent tend to possess more property than those of lesser bail tit, and since the first object of government is to protect and encourage ability, it follows that the rights to property owners must be protected.
Property is divided unequally, and, in addition, there are many different kinds of property; men have e different interests pending upon the kind of property they own. For example, the inter SST of landowners differ from those who own businesses. Government must not only protect the conflicting interests of property owners, it muss t, at the same time, successfully regulate the conflicts that result from those who own, and those who do not Own, property. To Madison, there are only two ways to control a faction: one, to remove its ca sees and the second to control its effects.
The first is impossible. There are only two ways to remove the causes of a faction: destroy liberty or give rawer cit Zen the same opinions, passions, and interests. Destroying liberty is a “cure worse then the disease itself. ” and the second is impracticable. The causes of factions are thus part of the nature of man and we must deal with their effect s and accept their existence. The government created by the Constitution controls the damage caused by such factions.
The framers established a representative form of government, a government in w which the many elect the few who govern. Pure or direct democracies (countries in which all the citizens participate directly in making the laws) cannot possibly con roll factious conflicts. This is because the strongest and largest faction dominates, and there is no way to protect weak factions against the actions of an obnoxious us individual or a strong majority, Direct democracies cannot fee actively protect personal and property rights and have always been characterized by conflict.
Fifth new plan of government is adopted, Maid son hopes that the men elected to office will be Wise and good men the best of America. Theoretically, those who govern should be the least likely to sacrifice the public good to temporary condition, but the opposite m get happen. Men who are members of particular factions. Or who have pre judies or evil motives might manage, by intrigue or corruption, to win eel actions and then betray the interests of the people. However, the possibility y of this happening in a large country, such as ours, is greatly reduced.
The likelihood that public office will be held by qualified men is greater in large co entries because there will be more representative chosen by a greater n umber of citizens. This makes it more difficult for the candidates to De chive the people. Representative government is needed in large country s, not to protect the people from the tyranny of the few, but to guard against the rule Of the mob. In large republics, factions Will be numerous, but they Will be weaker than in small, direct democracies where it is easier for factions to c insolate their strength.
In this country, leaders Of factions may be able to influence state governments to support unsound economic and political policies to promote, for example, specifically delegated to it; the states, far from being a abolished, retain much of their sovereignty. Fifth framers had abolished the state governments, the opponents of the proposed government would have a legitimate tee objection. The immediate object of the constitution is to bring the present t hearten states into a secure union.
Almost every state, old and new, will have on e boundary next to territory owned by a towering nation. The states farthest from the center of the country will be most endangered by these foreign countries; t hey may find it inconvenient to send representatives long distances to the capita l, but in terms of safety and protection they stand to gain the most from a strong national government. Madison concludes that he presents thee previous arguments because he is confident that those who Veil not listen to those “prophets of g loom” who say that the proposed government is unworkable.
For this founding father, it seems incredible that these gloomy voices suggest abandonment of the idea of combing together in strength the States still have common interests. Madison concludes that “according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being Republicans, ought to b e our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of Federalists. ” Analysis: James Madison carried to the Convention a plan that was the exact opposite of H million’s. In fact, the theory he advocated at Philadelphia and in his federalist essays was deep eloped as a republican substitute for the New Yorker’s “high toned” scheme of SST ate.
Madison was convinced that the class struggle would be ameliorated in America by establish nag limited federal government that would make functional use of the vast is zee Of the country and the existence Of the sates as active political organisms. H e argued in his “Notes on Confederacy,” in his Convention speeches, and again in Federalist 10 that if an extended republic was set up including a multiplicity of economic, geographic, social, religious, and sectional interests, these inter sets, by checking each other, would prevent American society from being divided into the clashing armies of the rich and the poor.
Thus, if no interstate proletariat tit could become organized on purely economic lines, the property of the rich would be safe even though the mass of the people held political power, Madison’ s solution for the class struggle was not to set up an absolute and irresponsible s Tate to regiment society from above; he was never willing to sacrifice liberty to GA in security. He wished to multiply the deposits of political power in the state itself f sufficiently to break down the sole dualism of rich and poor and thus to Guarani tee both libber and security.
This, as he stated in Federalist 10, would provide a “republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government, ” It is also interesting to note that James Madison was the most creative and Phil sophistical disciple of the Scottish school of science and politics in the Philadelphia hi Convention. His effectiveness as an advocate oaf new constitution, and oft he particular constitution that was drawn up in Philadelphia in 1787, avgas CE attain based in a large part on his personal experience in public life and his p arsenal knowledge of the conditions of American in 1787.
But Madison Greg atones as a statesmen rest in part on his ability quite deliberately to set his limited personal experience in the context Of the experience Of men in Other ages and times, thus giving extra insight to his political formulations. His most amazing political prophecy, contained within the pages of Fee derailed 10, was that the size of the United Sates and its variety of inter sets could be made a guarantee of stability and justice under the new c institution.
When Madison made this prophecy the accepted opinion among all sophisticated politicians was exactly the opposite. It was David Home’s speculations on the “Idea Oaf Perfect Commonwealth,” first published in 1 752, that most stimulated James Madison’ thought on factions. In this essay Hum e disclaimed any attempt to substitute a political utopia for “the common boot heed and inaccurate governments which seemed to serve imperfect men so well l. Nevertheless, he argued, the idea of a perfect commonwealth “is surely the MO SST worthy curiosity of any the wit of man can possibly devise.